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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
EDWARD ONISKOR, 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
vs, 
SAMUEL W. SMITH, Warden, 
Utah State Prison, 
Defendant-
Respondent. 
Case No. 14003 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by the appellant, Edward Oniskor, 
from an order granting a motion to dismiss. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., of the Third 
Judicial District Court granted respondent's motion to dismiss 
in response to appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ' 
Respondent submits that the order of the lower court 
granting the motion to dismiss should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Complaints were signed charging the appellant with 
committing robbery from a person on or about the first day of 
January, 19 71, and did at the same time and place commit the 
crime of murder in the first degree and further, committed at 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the same time and place the crime of rape. 
All evidence indicated that in the early morning hours 
of New Year's Day, 19 71, Mrs, Lucille R. Pierron, who lived 
alone in an apartment located on 25th Street in Ogden, Utah, was 
assaulted, robbed, raped and murdered by the appellant. Appel-
lant was apprehended by the Ogden City Police after he was 
observed to be in the possession of a ring and certain keys 
belonging to the deceased Pierron (T. 905). After questioning 
he confessed to the killing and the robbery (T. 90 7). 
A verdict of guilty on all three charges was returned 
by the jury. 
Appellant appealed his conviction to the Utah Supreme 
Court which affirmed in an opinion reported in State v. Oniskor, 
29 Utah 2d 395, 510 P.2d 929 (1973); 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S USE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS 
INAPPROPRIATE AND THUS THERE WAS NO ERROR IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION TO DISMISS. 
The appellant's use of a writ of habeas corpus to 
(1) present issues that were unsuccessfully raised on appeal, 
(2) challenge the sufficiency of evidence, and (3) raise 
alleged error which was known at the time of a. prior appeal but 
which was not then contested, is inappropriate. 
(1) Appellant raises two issues which were previously 
raised and unsuccessfully appealed in State v. Oniskor, 29 Utah 
2d 395, 510 P.2d 929 (1973), Case No. 12696. Appellant alleges 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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no new facts and the constitutional issues—the right to 
confrontation and the admissiblity of expert testimony 
based on hearsay evidence—are identical. 
In State v. Oniskor, supra, the petitioner alleged 
that it was a denial of his Sixth Amendment right to confronta-
tion to allow the state to read testimony given at the 
preliminary hearing by two witnesses, who were outside of 
the state at the time of the trial. 510 P.2d at 930. 
The Court ruled on this issue by saying: 
"The use of the depositions at the 
trial constituted a denial of defendant's 
constitutional right of confrontation. 
However, the testimony of these two absent 
witnesses was merely cumulative since 
others also testified to essentially the 
same facts. A survey of the record reveals 
that the other evidence against defendant 
was so overwhelming that this court is 
compelled to conclude beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the denial of defendant's rights 
constituted harmless error." 510 P.2d at 
931. 
At the time of his appeal, petitioner also contended 
that the trial court erred in its ruling that an expert witness 
may render an opinion based upon hearsay evidence. 510 P.2d 
at 931. The court ruled on this issue by saying: 
-3-
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"The trial court erred in its 
ruling that this opinion evidence, 
based on hearsay, was admissible. 
This error and its effect must be 
evaluated in conformity with Section 
77-42-1, U.C.A. 1953, which requires 
this court to render judgment without 
regard to errors or defects which do 
not affect the substantial rights of 
the parties. To interfere with a 
jury verdict, the error must be such 
that it was reasonably probable that 
there would have been a result more 
favorable to the defendant in the 
absence of error. An evaluation of 
this extensive record compels a 
conclusion that the asserted errors 
were insignificant and in no way 
resulted in prejudice to defendant's 
cause. The judgment of the trial court 
is affirmed." 510 P.2d at 932. 
As to the permissiblity of using the writ of habeas 
corpus for such purposes, the Utah Supreme Court has held that 
a litigant cannot present the same issues in a habeas corpus 
proceeding that he had heretofore unsuccessfully raised on 
appeal. Scandrett v. Turner, 26 Utah 2d 371, 489 P.2d 1186 
(1971); State v. Morgan, Utah 2d , 527 P.2d 225 (1974). 
Likewise, the Arizona Supreme Court in Yanich v. 
Eyman, 108 Ariz. 585, 503 P.2d 807 (1972), held that a trial 
court had no jurisdiction to consider a writ of habeas corpus 
where an appeal from the petitioner's conviction was pending 
- 4 -
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and raised the same issues as set forth in the petition. The 
court, citing State ex rel. Bessman v. Theisen, 142 S.W. 1088 
(1912), stated: 
"Where one court has competent 
jurisdiction of the person and is 
proceeding to exercise it, it would 
be a great outrage upon the administra-
tion of justice if a court of equal or 
inferior jurisdiction should by virtue 
of the writ of habeas corpus seek to 
override the jurisdiction of the former 
by discharging the person and thus 
annulling its writs and processes and 
rendering abortive any judgment it 
might lawfully render." 
Appellant cites Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 9 L.Ed.2d 
837, 83 S.Ct. 822 (1963), and maintains that the rationale 
behind the decision should apply to state prisoners seeking 
relief in state courts. The Supreme Court in Fay indicated 
that a federal district court could review a decision 
previously rendered by a competent state court by means of 
the writ of habeas corpus. The reasoning given was stated: 
" . . . the state adjudication 
carries the weight that federal 
practice gives to the conclusion of 
a court . . . of another jurisdiction 
on federal constitutional issues. 
It is not res judicata." 
- 5 -
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The Court merely reiterated its position on federal review 
of state determination of federal constitutional issues. 
The attempt by appellant to apply the above case to a state 
prisoner's use of habeas corpus to circumvent a previously 
rendered state final decision is inappropriate and there is 
a vast difference between federal review of a state inter-
pretation of federal questions and the type of intra-state 
review appellant is seeking. 
Appellant presents the same due process arguments 
to this court in the form of a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus as was unsuccessfully presented to the Utah Supreme 
Court in the appeal from conviction. Therefore, as per the 
case law cited above, the motion to dismiss should be affirmed. 
(2) Appellant contends that his conviction of 
rape and murder is so devoid of evidentiary support as to 
amount to a denial of due process. It is well established 
that the appellant cannot raise questions of insufficiency of 
evidence to sustain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
In Johnson v. Turner, 429 F.2d 1152 (10th Cir. 1970), 
the Court of Appeals stated: 
- 6 -
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"The sufficiency of the 
evidence to sustain a conviction 
is not subject to review in our 
federal habeas corpus proceedings 
unless the conviction is so devoid 
of evidentiary support as to have 
a due process issue." 
See also Sinclair v. Turner, 447 F.2d 1158 (10th Cir. 1971), 
cert, den. 405 U.S. 1048 (1972); Mathis v. Colorado, 425 
F.2d 1165 (10th Cir. 1970). 
In addition, appellant's claim of insufficient 
evidence is without merit because (1) there was a confession 
which was entered into the record and was ruled voluntarily 
given, wherein petitioner admitted suffocating the victim 
(T.750); (2) petitioner took the stand and related the events 
of the murder and admitted that he had suffocated and had 
sexual intercourse with the victim (T.881,882) ; (3) petitioner 
called his own psychiatrist who testified that the petitioner 
had informed him he had suffocated and had intercourse with 
the victim (T.811). Furthermore, in State v. Oniskor, supra, 
the court found that the evidence against appellant was 
"overwhelming." 510 P.2d at 931. 
(3) Appellant did not raise the issue of insuf-
ficiency of evidence at his appeal from conviction in 
State v. Oniskor, supra. If appellant claims that there 
was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction for 
- 7 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
murder and rape, this certainly would have been known to him 
at the time he appealed his conviction. Plis failure to raise 
the issue on appeal bars him from using the writ of habeas 
corpus as a substitute appeal under current case law. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held in Velasquez v. Pratt, 
21 Utah 2d 229, 443 P.2d 1020 (1968): 
"[H]abeas corpus is not and cannot 
properly be used in the place of a 
regular appellate review. As to any 
claimed error or irregularity which was 
known or should have been known to the 
appellant at the time of judgment, there 
was first an obligation to call it to the 
trial court's attention and seek remedy; and 
that failing, there was next a duty to seek 
review and correction on appeal. If that 
is not done within the time allowed by law, 
the judgment becomes final and not subject 
to further attack for any matters which 
could have been so reviewed on regular 
appeal.11 
The California Supreme Court held accordingly in In re Walker, 
112 Cal. Rptr. 177, 518 P.2d 1129 (1974), when it stated: 
"The general rule is that habeas corpus 
cannot serve as a substitute for appeal, and, 
in the absence of special circumstances con-
stituting an excuse for failure to employ that 
remedy, the writ will not lie where the claimed 
errors could have been, but were not, raised 
upon a timely appeal from a judgment of con-
viction. " 
See also Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 (1968); 
People v. Jones, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345, 510 P.2d 705 (1973). 
For the above reasons, respondent contends that 
appellant has made inappropriate use of the writ of habeas corpus 
and, therefore., the order granting the motion to dismiss should 
be affirmed. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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POINT II 
ANY POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS WAS HARMLESS ERROR BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT AND THUS 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS. 
It is well settled that if the errors of the lower 
court, alleged on appeal, are so insignificant as to be harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt, such errors cannot be used as a 
basis for reversal. 
The United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824 (1967), 
declined to adopt the rule that all federal constitutional 
errors must be per se "harmful." The Court stated: 
"We conclude that there may be 
some constitutional errors which in the 
setting of a particular case are so unim-
portant and insignificant that they may, 
consistent with the Federal Constitution, 
be deemed harmless, not requiring the 
automatic reversal of the conviction." 
The Court went on to establish the standard to b6 
used in determining when a particular error is "harmless," 
". . .that before a federal constitutional 
error can be held harmless, the court must be 
able to declare a belief that it was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt." (Emphasis added.) 
Chapman reaffirmed in Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 
23 L.Ed.2d 284, 89 S.Ct. 1726 (1969). 
- 9 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Scandrett, 24 
Utah 2d 202, 468 P.2.d 639 (1970), held: 
11
 . • . [T]here is a presumption that 
such error is prejudicial, but that it 
can be overcome when the court is con-
vinced beyond a reasonable doubt that it 
had no such prejudicial effect upon the 
proceedings. Correlative to this it is 
also true that when the guilt is shown 
by other untainted evidence so overwhelm-
ing that there is no likelihood whatsoever 
of a different result in the absence of 
such error or irregularity, there should 
be no reversal." 
Furthermore, this position has been codified in 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1 (1953): 
"After hearing an appeal the court 
must give judgment without regard to 
defects which do not affect the sub-
stantial right of the parties. If 
error has been committed, it shall 
not be presumed to have resulted in 
prejudice. The court must be satis-
fied that it has that effect before it 
is warranted in reversing the judgment." 
The Utah Supreme Court has already held in State-
v. Oniskor, supra, that the errors asserted in this petition 
— the denial of the right to confrontation and the admissibility 
of expert testimony — were, as a matter of law, "harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt." Referring to the errors alleged 
on appeal, the Court said: 
- 10 -
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"A survey of the record reveals 
that the other evidence against defendant 
was so overwhelming that this court is 
compelled to conclude beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the denial of defendant's 
rights constituted harmless error. 
"An evaluation of this extensive 
record compels a conclusion that the 
asserted errors were insignificant and 
in no way resulted in prejudice to 
defendant's cause." 
The evidence against appellant, consisting of his 
own confession and the direct testimony of other witnesses, , 
is so overwhelming, any possible violation of appellant's 
constitutional rights was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
and does not call for reversal. 
POINT III 
PRIOR UTAH SUPREME COURT HOLDINGS DO NOT PRECLUDE THE 
USE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS A POST-CONVICTION REMEDY. 
Appellant contends that the holdings of Scandrett v. 
Turner, supra, and Velasquez v. Pratt, supra, abrogate Article 
I, § 5 of the Utah Constitution in that they preclude the 
use of the writ of habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy. 
Such assertion is without merit. 
First, Article I, § 5, which states that the writ of 
habeas corpus will not be suspended unless required by rebellion, 
- 11 -
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invasion, or public safety, pertains to the traditional 
type of habeas corpus as outlined in Rule 65B(f) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure—not the post-conviction type of 
Rule 65B(i) sought by appellant in this case. 
Second, the cases cited only limit the availability 
of the writ, of habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy— 
they do not preclude it. The Utah Supreme Court in Scandrett 
v. Turner, supra, and Velasquez v. Pratt, supra, has indicated 
the need to limit the use of habeas corpus as a post-conviction 
remedy based mainly on the public policy as expressed in 
Johnson v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 439, 473 P.2d 901 (1970) : 
"The efficient and orderly 
administration of justice and respect 
for the finality of judgments 
regularly arrived at demand that 
the merry-go-round of litigation 
stop somewhere." 
However, the Court has not precluded the use of habeas corpus 
altogether as a post-conviction remedy. The Court in Johnson 
v. Turner, supra, went on to say: 
" . . . where it appears that 
there has been a miscarriage of justice 
that it would be unconscionable not to 
re-examine a conviction, . . . we do not 
regard the rules of procedure as being 
so absolute as to prevent us from 
- 12 -
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correcting any such obvious 
injustice." 
The above indicates when such use of habeas corpus would be 
appropriate. 
In Sullivan v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 85, 448 P.2d 
907 (1968), the Utah Supreme Court indicated that the use 
of the writ of habeas corpus as a collateral attack to an 
appeal is appropriate only: 
" . . . when the interests of 
justice so demand because of some 
extraordinary circumstances or 
exigency; e.g., 
(1) lack of jurisdiction, 
(2) mistaken identity, 
(3) where the requirements of 
law have been so ignored or distorted 
that the accused has been deprived of 
due process of law, or 
(4) there is shown to exist some 
other such circumstance that it would 
be unconscionable not to review the 
conviction." (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, while the Utah Supreme Court has specified 
under what circumstances the writ of habeas corpus can be 
used as a collateral attack to an appeal, those available 
situations are limited and carefully scrutinized. 
In the instant case, appellant has failed to show 
such "extraordinary" or "exigent" circumstances. Appellant 
- 13 -
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was represented by competent counsel during his original 
appeal in State v. Oniskor, supra, and the Court found 
that the evidence against him was so overwhelming that any 
possible error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Thus, appellant's use of the writ of habeas corpus fails 
to satisfy the requirements of Sullivan v. Turner, supra, or 
Johnson v. Turner, supra, and thus should be dismissed. 
POINT IV 
. THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPELLANT IS INAPPROPRIATE 
IN THAT IT GOES BEYOND THE AVAILABLE SCOPE OF APPEAL FOR 
THIS CASE. 
Appellant seeks as relief on appeal "the reversal 
of the order of the lower court and the granting of his 
petition." Such relief is inappropriate since the only 
issue on appeal is the validity of the order granting the 
motion to dismiss. Thus, the only issues to be appealed are 
those presented in the motion to dismiss; namely, the use 
of the writ of habeas corpus as a substitute for appellate 
review, as a second appeal, or to challenge the sufficiency 
of evidence; and the extent of harmless error. Requesting 
this Court to grant appellant's petition is improper since 
- 14 -
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this would deny respondent the opportunity of presenting 
supporting evidence in an appropriate hearing. The only 
relief that may be requested by appellant is a remand for 
hearing—not a granting of the writ of habeas corpus. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's inappropriate use of the writ of 
habeas corpus and the "harmless" and non-prejudicial nature 
of the alleged errors warrants an affirmation by this 
Court of the order granting the motion to dismiss. Further-
more, as a policy matter, appellant should be precluded from 
using the writ of habeas corpus to relitigate issues that 
have previously been adjudicated and finally determined on 
appeal. There must be at some point an end to the judicial 
process. The writ of habeas corpus was never intended to 
be a tool to needlessly extend the resolution of previously 
adjudicated issues. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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